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. K. Bagwell 1995, Games Econ. Beha¨. 8, 271]280 claims that, in models of
commitment, ‘‘the ﬁrst-mover advantage is eliminated when there is a slight
amount of noise associated with the observation of the ﬁrst-mover’s selection.’’ We
show that the validity of this claim depends crucially on the restriction to pure
strategy equilibria. The game analyzed by Bagwell always has a mixed equilibrium
that is close to the Stackelberg equilibrium when the noise is small. Furthermore,
an equilibrium selection theory that combines elements from the theory of Harsanyi
 and Selten 1988, A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. Cambridge,
. MA: MIT Press with elements from the theory of Harsanyi 1995, Games Econ.
. Beha¨. 8, 91]122 , actually selects this ‘‘noisy Stackelberg equilibrium.’’ Journal of
Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Number: C72. Q 1997 Academic Press
1. INTRODUCTION
One of the most important insights in game theory is that the power to
commit oneself may confer a strategic advantage; it may be beneﬁcial to
constrain one’s own behavior in order to induce others to behave in a way
that is favorable to oneself. One possibility to commit oneself is to move
 early, to preempt the others by choosing and communicating the irreversi-
. ble action that one takes before the rivals take their actions. This idea
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. dates back at least to Von Stackelberg 1934 who demonstrated the
existence of a ‘‘ﬁrst-mover advantage’’ in a quantity-setting duopoly.
. Schelling’s 1960 classic The Strategy of Conﬂict generalized Von Stackel-
berg’s initial insight in several dimensions by describing richer commit-
ment tactics, as well as by illustrating the ubiquity of the phenomenon that
in independent decision situations weakness confers strength, that power
may result from the power to bind oneself.
Schelling already pointed out that, for a commitment to an action to be
credible, the commitment must be irreversible. At least reneging should be
sufﬁciently costly. Schelling also stressed that the efﬁcacy of commitment
depends on the communication structure of the game. If the opponent is
unavailable for messages, or can destroy all communication channels
before any communication takes place, being able to commit oneself is of
no value. Hence, commitment can be beneﬁcial only if the communication
channel is sufﬁciently reliable.
Just how important this reliability of the communication channel is has
. recently been shown in Bagwell 1995 . Bagwell shows that it is essential
that there are no ambiguities, that there are no misunderstandings about
the action to which the player committed himself. In fact, Bagwell claims
that ‘‘the ﬁrst-mover advantage is eliminated when there is even a slight
amount of noise associated with the observation of the ﬁrst-mover’s
 . . selection’’ Bagwell 1995, Abstract , emphasis in the original , and he
concludes that ‘‘the many predictions derived from models with commit-
ment may require reconsideration’’ since ‘‘the requirement of perfect
observability is quite stringent and would seem to be violated in a number
of real-world settings to which popular commitment models are thought to
 . . apply’’ Bagwell 1995, p. 278 .
Bagwell bases the above claim and conclusion on his result that, if there
is some noise, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium outcome of the game in
which one of the players can commit must be a Nash equilibrium outcome
of the game in which this commitment possibility is absent. The intuition
. for this striking result can be easily conveyed. Let g s A , A , u , u be 12 1 2
a two-person normal form game and consider the sequential move game
with player 1 moving ﬁrst. In contrast to the usual Stackelberg model,
assume, however, that player 2 is only imperfectly informed about player
1’s commitment. Speciﬁcally, if player 1 commits to a g A , player 2 11
X 
X. receives the signal a g A with probability paN a ) 0. The crucial 11 1 1
observation is that this ‘‘nonmoving support’’ assumption implies that
player 2’s signal is completely uninformative when player 1 commits to a
pure action a
U; Bayes’ rule dictates that 2 believes that 1 played a
U no 1 1
matter what signal he receives. If 2’s best response to a
U in g is unique 1
 U. U say it is a , then 2 will respond with a no matter what message he 22
receives; hence, in order to have an equilibrium in the sequential moveVAN DAMME AND HURKENS 284
game, a
U should be a best response against a
U as well. Consequently, 12
 UU . a , a must be an equilibrium of g. Note that this argument applies even 12
in the case where player 2 is almost perfectly informed about the commit-
. ment, i.e., if paN a f 1 for all a g A . 11 1 1
Bagwell’s result is obviously driven by the speciﬁc type of imperfection
in the communication technology that he assumes. It is not the case that
the commitment sometimes is not communicated; it is rather that the
opponent with a small probability receives the wrong message. To put it
differently, Bagwell’s is a model of errors in perception, rather than of
errors in communication. For example, if a seller commits himself to ‘‘I do
not sell for a price less than $100,’’ the buyer might interpret this as ‘‘I do
not sell for less than $10,000’’ or as a commitment to ‘‘I give the object
away for free.’’ Bagwell’s ‘‘nonmoving support’’ restriction implies that all
such misunderstandings are possible, albeit possibly unlikely. We do no
want to enter into the debate about whether, or in which contexts, the
assumed communication technology is appropriate. With Bagwell we agree
that such discussions are best carried out in the context of speciﬁc
applications. Nevertheless, we believe that this speciﬁc assumption might
explain why Bagwell’s result appears counterintuitive at ﬁrst. For example,
if communication errors would take the form as suggested in Schelling
.  1960, p. 149 i.e., commitments would not necessarily be communicated
to the second mover, but if they are communicated, they are communi-
. cated without error , then there would not be a lack of robustness of the
type that Bagwell notes. The reader can easily verify that in the latter case,
as long as the probability that the commitment is received is sufﬁciently
 high, a player will commit himself to his Stackelberg strategy. See Chakra-
. vorti and Spiegel, 1993, for a formal analysis.
As Bagwell’s claim and conclusion are based on a result concerning pure
strategy equilibria, they rely either on the implicit assumption that it is
sufﬁcient to look at pure strategy equilibria, or on a belief that a similar
result could also be obtained for mixed strategy equilibria. In our opinion,
the restriction to pure strategy equilibria is not compelling and the game
theory literature has offered no justiﬁcation for this restriction so far. In
addition, as is well known, pure strategy Nash equilibria might fail to exist
and existence might be viewed as the most fundamental property that a
solution concept should satisfy. Consequently, in this paper we take the
position that there is no a priori reason to discriminate against equilibria
that are not in pure strategies. We take mixed strategies seriously and
investigate what remains of the above claims when these are taken into
account.
In the context of a speciﬁc 2 = 2 example, Bagwell already showed that
his claim and conclusion depend on the restriction to pure strategy
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approximately recovered from one mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium for the
 noisy-leader game when observability is ‘‘close’’ to perfect’’ Bagwell 1995,
.. p. 277 . We show in this paper that this statement is generally true; i.e.,
each noisy-leader game has a mixed-strategy equilibrium that generates an
outcome that converges to the Stackelberg outcome when the noise
. vanishes Proposition 3 . We also show that, besides this noisy Stackelberg
equilibrium and the pure equilibria uncovered by Bagwell, there may be
other equilibria as well.
Bagwell’s game, hence, raises the issue of equilibrium selection: If the
leader’s commitment can only be imperfectly observed, will players coordi-
 nate on a pure equilibrium of the simultaneous move game? and, if they
. do, on which one? , or will they coordinate on a noisy Stackelberg
equilibrium?, or will some completely different equilibrium result? Bagwell
does not address this selection issue. He argues that, since the noisy game
admits no off-equilibrium path information sets, backward-induction-based
reﬁnements are not particularly helpful. Consequently, he does not dis-
criminate among Nash equilibria and he concludes that there is certainly
no guarantee that a noisy Stackelberg equilibrium will in fact obtain
. Bagwell, 1995, p. 277 . One aim of this paper is to explicitly address this
selection problem and we give arguments for why the noisy Stackelberg
equilibrium might be the unique focal one.
A general theory of equilibrium selection has been described in Harsanyi
. . and Selten 1988 . An alternative theory has been given in Harsanyi 1995 .
As we show in this paper, neither theory need select the noisy Stackelberg
. equilibrium in general. However, as we argue, this is partly due to the
fact that these theories mix arguments that correspond to the evolutionary
. learning interpretation of the Nash equilibrium concept with arguments
. that are associated with the rationalistic one-shot interpretation of that
concept. In our opinion, it is preferable to keep these arguments separate.
While discriminating against mixed equilibria may be justiﬁed in an
evolutionary context, such discrimination most probably is not appropriate
in a purely deductive context. We show that, in the latter case, the noisy
Stackelberg equilibrium may indeed be focal. Speciﬁcally, we devise a new
theory of equilibrium selection that combines elements from the
Harsanyi]Selten theory with elements from the new theory of Harsanyi
that does select a noisy Stackelberg equilibrium.
No doubt, some readers may criticize our ‘‘mix-and-match’’ approach
and some of this criticism may be justiﬁed. Nevertheless, we wish to argue
that our theory has a certain intuitive appeal and that it is no less ad hoc
than any of the other theories. Furthermore, at present there is no
unanimously accepted theory of equilibrium selection and the various
theories that have been proposed are far from perfectly understood. In the
absence of convincing axiomatizations}of which we are far removed atVAN DAMME AND HURKENS 286
the present stage}the only way to increase our understanding seems to be
to compute various examples, to see the theories in action. The noisy-leader
game provides an interesting test bed to compare these various theories
and, indeed, the comparisons are illuminating. Hence, although we would
conclude that the main message of this paper is that there is no immediate
need to reconsider the literature that applies the idea of a ‘‘ﬁrst-mover
advantage,’’ the paper may also be read as an exercise in equilibrium
selection.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the noisy commitment game. The Nash equilibria of this game are investi-
gated in Section 3. In particular it is proved that the noisy game admits a
mixed equilibrium of which the outcome converges to the Stackelberg
outcome of the game with perfect observability when the noise vanishes.
Section 4 describes our equilibrium selection theory and proves that it
selects a noisy Stackelberg equilibrium. Section 5 is devoted to the distinc-
tion between evolutionary and eductive theories and provides a partial
justiﬁcation for Bagwell’s claim in an evolutionary context. The Sections 6
. and 7 are, respectively, devoted to the theories of Harsanyi 1995 and
. Harsanyi and Selten 1988 . Section 8 concludes.
2. THE NOISY COMMITMENT GAME
. Let g be a ﬁnite two-person game in strategic form. Since below we
will mainly be interested in what happens when the players move sequen-
. tially rather than simultaneously, we label the players as L for leader and
.  . F for follower . I resp. J denotes the set of pure strategies of player L
. . resp. player F in g and u resp. ¨ denotes this player’s payoff when ij ij
.  . << the strategy pair i, j is played. We identify I resp. J with the ﬁrst I
 << . resp. J positive integers. Throughout this paper we assume that g
satisﬁes the following regularity condition
1:
if i, j / k, l , then u / u and ¨ /¨ .2 . 1 .. . ij kl ij kl
1 . Bagwell 1995 restricts himself to the case where player F has a unique best response to
. any pure action i of player L. He writes on p. 275 that the basic results are most easily
reported in this case, from which the reader might be tempted to conclude that his result
. Proposition 1 in our paper is also valid for games that do not satisfy this condition. That
conclusion, however, is unwarranted as we show in the Appendix.IMPERFECTLY OBSERVABLE COMMITMENT 287
This assumption implies that F has a unique best response against each
pure strategy i of L. This best response will be denoted by b and we write i
u s u .2 . 2 . ii b i
. Given 2.1 , the sequential move game in which L moves before F and
in which F is perfectly informed about the pure action that L has chosen
has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. We use b to denote the SPE
. strategy of F in this game; hence, b responds to i with bi g I . Without i
further loss of generality we assume that
u ) max u 2.3 . 1 i
i / 1
. so that the SPE-outcome is 1, b if L’s choice is observed perfectly. 1
In the remainder we focus our attention on the noisy version of the
sequential move game in which F is only imperfectly informed about
which action has been chosen by L. To that end, let P be a stochastic
. matrix deﬁned on the state space I. Hence, P s p with p G 0 ik i,kgIi k
and  p s 1 for all i. The interpretation is that F receives the signal ‘‘L ki k
played k’’ with a probability p in case L actually plays i. Emphasis will ik
be on the situation where the noise, i.e., the probability of receiving the
‘‘wrong’’ signal is small but positive. Writing P
0 for the identity matrix on
 0 . I i.e., p s 1 for all i we measure the absolute level of the noise by the ii
distance between P and P
0 and we write
<< < 0 < P s max p y p : i, k g I .2 . 4 . 4 ik ik
We will restrict ourselves to the case where any signal can result from any
action; i.e., just as Bagwell, we impose a ‘‘nonmoving support’’ assumption:
p ) 0 for all i, k g I.2 . 5 . ik
Formally then, we consider the extensive form game g
P given by the
following rules:
1. player L chooses an action i g I,
2. chance chooses k g I with probability p , ik
3. player F learns k and chooses j g J,
4. player L receives the payoff u and F receives ¨ . ij ij
The game g
P is referred to as a noisy commitment game. Note that the
. messages the signals that F receives are payoff irrelevant. Consequently,
P . g differs essentially from a ‘‘perturbed game’’ as used in Selten’s 1975
perfectness construction. In a Selten-perturbation of the ordinary sequen-VAN DAMME AND HURKENS 288
tial move game, if L intends to choose i, he trembles with small probabil-
ity and, hence, he might actually choose k. F then observes k, he chooses
a response j, and the players’ payoffs are u and ¨ , respectively. In an kj kj
equilibrium of such a ‘‘Selten-perturbation,’’ F chooses b in response to k
any signal k; hence, L chooses ‘‘1’’ when the trembles are sufﬁciently
small. We will see that the noisy commitment game is not that straightfor-
ward to analyse.
.  . P  We denote a behavioral strategy of player L resp. F in g by s resp.
. . f and we write s s s, f for a strategy combination. Hence, s is a
. probability distribution on I, s g D I , and f is a map that assigns a
. I probability distribution on J to each element of I, i.e., f g D J . We let
s denote the probability that L chooses i while f is the probability that i kj
F chooses j in response to the message k. We write f s j if f s 1 and kk j
use similar conventions throughout the text. The outcome of the strategy
. PP P . pair s s s, f in g is the probability distribution z s z s that s
induces on I = J. Hence, we have that
z
P s s sp f .2 . 6 .  . ij  ii k k j
k g I
Note that z
P may involve nontrivial correlation of the players’ actions.
. PP . Player L’s expected payoff in g is written as u s and F’s payoff is
P. denoted by ¨ s ; hence
u
P s s E E u N z
P s ,¨
P s s E E ¨ N z
P s .2 . 7 . . . .  . . .
. P A pair s s s, f is a Nash equilibrium of g if s is a best reply against f
and f is a best reply against s. Since there are no unreached information
sets in g
P, any Nash equilibrium is a sequential equilibrium. Furthermore,
f is a best response against s if and only if, for every message k, f is a k
best response against the posterior beliefs that s induces at k. By Bayes’
rule, this posterior belief that F associates to i g I after having received
the message k is given by
m
P, s s ps r ps ,2 . 8 .  ik ik i ak a
agI
so that, for all s with s ) 0 k
1i f i s k P , s lim m s 2.9 . ik 0i f i / k . << P ª 0
Hence, if the noise is small and F expects L to choose k with positive
probability, then he will attach high probability to the event that L
. actually played k when he receives the message ‘‘k.’’ Assumption 2.1 thus
implies that F will respond to k with b in this case. Lemma 1 proves a k
slightly stronger statement.IMPERFECTLY OBSERVABLE COMMITMENT 289
<< L EMMA 1. There exists «* ) 0 such that for all P with 0 - P - «*, all
' . << strategy combinations s s s, f and all i g I: If s ) P and f is a best i
reply against s in g
P, then f s b . ii
. Proof. The regularity assumption 2.1 implies that there exists d - 1
such that for all i g I: If player F assigns at least probability d to L
playing i in g, then b is the unique best response of F in g. Let «*b e i
y 1 ' . << such that 1 q «* G d, choose P such that 0 - P s « - «* and let
' .  . s g DIand i g I be such that s ) « . Then we obtain from 2.8 i
ps ii i P, s m G ii « 1ys qps . ii i i
y 1 s 1 q « 1 y s r ps . ii i i
y 1 ' G 1 q « .
y 1 ' G 1 q « * .
G d .
If f is a best reply against s, then f is a best reply against the posterior i
beliefs m
P, s for all i; hence, f s b . B ii i
3. EQUILIBRIA IN THE NOISY COMMITMENT GAME
. For the sake of completeness we start by stating and proving Bagwell’s
main result.
. P ROPOSITION 1 Bagwell, 1995 . The set of pure strategy equilibrium
outcomes of g and g
P coincide.
. Proof. Assume i, j is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in g. Then
P . j s b and if f is the strategy of F in g deﬁned by f s bk g I , then i ki
. P i , f is an equilibrium of g . It obviously produces the same outcome as
. . P i , j does. Assume i, f is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in g . Since
m
P, i s 1 for all k, we must have f s b for all k. Hence, i is a best reply ik k i
. against b in g and i, b is an equilibrium of g with the same outcome as ii
. i , f . B
Proposition 1 gives a sufﬁcient condition for an outcome to be an
equilibrium outcome of the game g
P. We now give a necessary condition
for the case where the noise is small. Write
N N s i, b : u G max minu 3.1 .  . 5 ii k j
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for the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of the game in which player L’s
 . commitment is perfectly observed by F. Note that because of 2.1 any
. such Nash equilibrium outcome has to be pure. The next proposition
shows that the Nash equilibrium outcome correspondence of g
P is upper
hemi continuous at P s P
0.
PROPOSITION 2. Let z
P be an equilibrium outcome of g
P. If z s
lim z
P, then z g N N. <P<ª0
. Proof. The proof follows from regularity assumption 2.1 and Lemma
<<  PP . 1. Let «* be as in Lemma 1 and for P with 0 - P - «*, let s , f be an
equilibrium of g
P with outcome z
P. Assume the limit outcome z to exist.
PP P P '' << << If i / k, s ) P and s ) P , then f s b and f s b ; hence ik i i k k
lim u
P i, f
P s u , lim u
P k, f
P s u . .  . ik
<< << P ª 0 P ª 0
. But 2.1 implies that u / u ; hence, either i or k is not a best response ik
<< << PP when P is small. Consequently, for P sufﬁciently small, ss s 0 and ik
P ' << the contradiction shows that there is at most one i g I with s ) P .I t i
. follows that z s i, b for this particular value of i. It is obvious that the i
. inequalities in 3.1 must be satisﬁed. If there would exist k / i with
u - min u , then L would strictly prefer choosing k above choosing i in ij k j
P << gfor sufﬁciently small P . B
Proposition 2 implies that, if g has only mixed equilibria, the equilib-
rium outcomes of g are disjoint from the limit equilibrium outcomes of
the noisy commitment game when the noise vanishes. This shows that a
result similar to Proposition 1 cannot be proved for a ‘‘satisfactory’’
solution concept, i.e., for a reﬁnement of the Nash equilibrium concept
that generates a nonempty set of solutions for every game.
The game of Fig. 1 may show that not any Nash equilibrium outcome of
the game with perfect observability can be approximated by Nash equilib-
rium outcomes of games with slight noise; the equilibrium correspondence
. is not lower hemi-continuous. It is easily checked that B,W is a Nash
outcome of the nonnoisy game. It is optimal for L to commit to B if F
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responds to T with E. However, since W is a dominant strategy for F in g,
noise forces F to choose W in response to any signal. Consequently, only
. T , W can be approximated by equilibrium outcomes of noisy games.
 P More generally, g has a unique equilibrium whenever F has a dominant
. strategy in g.
Proposition 3 is the main result of this section. It shows that at least one
equilibrium outcome of the game with perfect observability, viz. the
Stackelberg outcome, is approximated by equilibrium outcomes of the
noisy commitment game when the noise vanishes. We will refer to such an
approximating equilibrium as a noisy Stackelberg equilibrium.
PP  PP . P ROPOSITION 3. The game g has an equilibrium s s s , f with an
P . << outcome z that con¨erges to 1, ba s P ª 0. 1
<< Proof. Let «* be as in Lemma 1 and let P - «*. Consider the
PP reduced strategic form g that results from the strategic form of g by
eliminating all pure strategies of F that do not prescribe to play b after 1
the signal ‘‘1.’’ In this reduced game, player L’s expected payoff resulting
from playing ‘‘1’’ is approximately u no matter what F plays. Let s
P s 1
PP P P ' . << s , f be an equilibrium of g .I fs) P for some i / 1, then i
P . f s b Lemma 1 and L’s payoff resulting from ‘‘i’’ is approximately u . ii i
P  P . P  P . In this case, ui , f - u1, f , so that player L wants to choose i with
probability zero. The contradiction shows that
P '<< sF P for all i / 1; 3.2 . i
P << hence, s ª 1a s Pª 0. Lemma 1 thus implies that at the signal ‘‘1’’ 1
only b is a best response of player F; hence, s
P is an equilibrium of g
P. 1
PP . << Obviously, the outcome z of s converges to 1, b as P ª 0. B 1
 Just as the necessary condition for limit equilibrium outcomes Proposi-
. .  tion 2 is not sufﬁcient Fig. 1 , the sufﬁcient conditions Propositions 1
. and 3 are not necessary. Also outcomes that are not pure Nash equilibria,
nor Stackelberg equilibria, of g may be approximated. Consider the game
. of Fig. 2 in which L has M as a dominant strategy, so that M,C is the
. unique Nash equilibrium. The Stackelberg equilibrium is T,W . Consider
the noisy commitment game with uniform noise; i.e., p s « if i / j and ij
p s1y2«. It is easily seen that the following strategy combination is an ii
equilibrium of this game: Player L commits to M with probability 3«r
.  . . 1 q « and to B with the remaining probability 1 y 2« r 1 q « ; player
F responds to signals T and B with E, after signal M he plays C with
. . . probability 2r 4 y 11« and E with probability 2 y 11« r 4 y 11« . The
. corresponding limit outcome is B, E .VAN DAMME AND HURKENS 292
FIGURE 2
We will not attempt to describe exactly which outcomes can be obtained
as limits of equilibrium outcomes of the noisy game as the noise tends to
zero. Rather we conclude from Propositions 1 and 3 that typically there
exist multiple limits and, hence, that there exists an equilibrium selection
problem. We will address this selection problem directly and we will
propose a theory according to which a noisy Stackelberg equilibrium is
uniquely focal. Our theory incorporates elements from the theory pro-
. posed by Harsanyi and Selten 1988 as well as elements from the theory
. proposed in Harsanyi 1995 . However, our theory differs from both its
ancestors and it may select different outcomes. In particular, neither the
HarsanyirSelten theory nor the new theory of Harsanyi need to select a
noisy Stackelberg equilibrium.
4. SELECTION OF THE STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we describe a general theory of equilibrium selection and
show that this theory selects a noisy Stackelberg equilibrium in g
P when
the noise P is small. Hence, when players behave in accordance to this
theory, they will consider the Stackelberg equilibrium to be uniquely focal.
The theory is simple and is based on the seminal equilibrium selection
. . theories from Harsanyi and Selten 1988 and Harsanyi 1995 . In particu-
lar, our theory assumes that the players use the tracing procedure from
.  . Harsanyi and Selten 1988 to convert their initial disequilibrium beliefs
into an equilibrium of the game and that players construct their prior
beliefs by incorporating the structural incentives to use the various pure
. strategies, as suggested in Harsanyi 1995 .
We do not want to argue that this hybrid theory is necessarily superior
to any of its ancestors. It certainly is simpler than the original
. HarsanyirSelten theory: The somewhat cumbersome tracing procedure
has to be applied only once and intransitivities are avoided. In other words,IMPERFECTLY OBSERVABLE COMMITMENT 293
the new theory makes a multilateral risk comparison, while the
Harsanyi]Selten theory relies on pairwise comparisons. Furthermore, the
hybrid theory is not completely ad hoc; many of the arguments that
Harsanyi and Selten use to defend their theory can be used to defend it. In
the absence of axiomatic underpinnings of any of these theories, discus-
sions about their reasonableness should not be solely conducted in the
abstract; one has to see the theories in action in order to make informed
judgements about their viability. Consequently, we will also attempt to
apply the original theories of Harsanyi and Selten and of Harsanyi to the
noisy commitment game. We will see that the ﬁrst theory is difﬁcult to
work with and that the second theory yields ambiguous results.
4.1. A Theory of Equilibrium Selection
To describe the general theory it is convenient to simplify notation
somewhat. Throughout this subsection we assume an arbitrary two-person
: game g s A , A , u , u as given. We use subscripts m and n to denote 12 1 2
players. Whenever m and n appear in the same expression it is understood
that n / m. We denote a generic pure strategy of player n by a and a n
. mixed strategy by s . Bs denotes the set of all pure best replies of nn m
player n against the mixed strategy s of player m. The ﬁrst main building m
block in our theory is the tracing procedure, which is a model of the
 players’ reasoning process. Starting from given prior expectations i.e., a
. mixed strategy pair , it gradually adjusts players’ plans and expectations
until they are in equilibrium. We only describe the mechanics of this
procedure. For the motivation and heuristic description of the process we
. . refer to Harsanyi 1975 and Harsanyi and Selten 1988 .
Let p be a mixed strategy combination in g, which is interpreted as the
players’ prior expectations. Hence, a priori player n believes that m will
. wx play a with probability pa. For t g 0,1 consider the strategic form mm m
game g
t, p deﬁned by
u
t, p a s tu a q 1 y tu a, p .4 . 1 . .  .  .  . nn n n m
Hence, for t s 1 this game coincides with g, while for t s 0 we have a
trivial game in which each player’s payoff depends only on his prior
. expectations. Write G p for the graph of the equilibrium correspondence,
i.e.,
wx t , p G p st ; s : t g 0,1 , s is an equilibrium of g .4 . 2 4 .  .  .
. It can be shown that in nondegenerate cases this graph G p contains a
unique distinguished curve that connects the unique equilibrium of g
0, p to
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interested reader may gain intuition by doing some computations for a
2 = 2 game. In this case, there generically is a unique curve connecting the
.. equilibrium at t s 0 with an equilibrium at t s 1. The linear tracing
procedure consists of following this curve until its endpoint, and the
. . endpoint Tps spis called the linear trace of p in g. The interpreta-
. tion is that players eventually reason themselves to the equilibrium Tpif
they start from the prior p. Formally, the tracing procedure thus is a map
. T that maps each mixed strategy vector p of g into an equilibrium Tp
of g.
It remains to specify how the prior should be constructed. We propose
. to follow Harsanyi 1995 and to construct the prior on the basis of the
players’ structural incentives to use their various pure strategies. The latter
are related to the sizes of the stability regions of these strategies. Speciﬁ-
cally, for a pure strategy a of player n deﬁne the stability set of a as the nn
. set Saof all mixed strategies of player m in g against which a is a mn n
best reply, i.e.,
Sas s g S : a g Bs .4 . 3 4 . .  . mn m m n n m
At ﬁrst it seems natural to measure the structural incentives of a pure
.  . strategy a by the Lebesgue measure of Sa , but Harsanyi 1995 shows nm n
that this deﬁnition would violate certain desirable properties. To circum-
vent these, Harsanyi ﬁrst transforms the strategy simplex S by the m
so-called inversion mapping v and he then takes the Lebesgue measure m
of the transformed set. Formally, v is the mapping from the interior of m
S to the interior of S that maps s into s deﬁned by mm m m
y 1 y 1 sas sa r sa .4 . 4 . .  . .  mm m m m
a g A m
Hence, Harsanyi measures the structural incentive of player n to use the
pure strategy a g A by the number
2
nn
c a s lv Sa ,4 . 5 . .  . . . nn mmn
where l denotes Lebesgue measure. We propose to use the mixed strategy
. vector determined by 4.5 as the players’ prior assessment about how the
game will be played and to use the tracing procedure to convert this prior
into an equilibrium of the game. Hence, formally we suggest to take as the
.  . solution of the game g the equilibrium T c , where c s c , c is as in 12
. 4.5 .
2 Harsanyi ﬁrst eliminates dominated and duplicate strategies to ensure that all remaining
pure strategies have stability sets with nonempty interiors and that intersections of interiors
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4.2. The Main Result
In this subsection we show that the above theory selects an equilibrium
outcome that is close to the Stackelberg outcome of g when the noise in
g
P is small. The intuition is simple. If L’s commitment is observed
perfectly, then the strategy b of player F is a best response against all
possible actions of L. While this is no longer true if there is a slight
 0. amount of noise i.e., P / P , it is still quite likely that b is a best
<< response. Speciﬁcally, as Lemma 1 has shown, if P - «*, then b is the
'<< unique best response against all s with s ) P for all k. Hence, the k
stability set of the strategy b of player F converges to the entire strategy
<< simplex of player L as P ª 0 and the stability set of any other pure
strategy converges to the empty set. It thus follows that the prior of player
. L , as constructed by 4.5 puts almost all weight on the strategy b of player
<< F when P is small. Consequently, L will be tempted to play his Stackel-
berg leader strategy ‘‘1.’’ On the other hand, Lemma 1 also implies that,
with player F’s prior being constructed in a similar way, F is tempted to
respond with b to any pure strategy i for which L’s structural incentive is i
. strictly positive. In particular, 2.1 implies that F initially plays b in 1
response to L’s Stackelberg action ‘‘1.’’ It is not too surprising that, if
players’ initial actions are the Stackelberg equilibrium actions, the tracing
procedure indeed forces the players to coordinate on a noisy Stackelberg
equilibrium. Formally, we have
PROPOSITION 4. Let s
P be the solution of the game g
P according to the
theory from Section 4.1 and let z
P be the outcome of this solution. Then
P . << zª 1, ba s P ª 0. 1
PP  P . P Proof. We have s s T c , where c describes the players struc-
P . P tural incentives in the game g , as deﬁned via 4.5 and where T denotes
the tracing map associated with g
P. It follows directly from the deﬁnitions
P. << that c b ª 1a s Pª0. Hence, the leader’s prior attaches high proba- F
bility to the follower always playing a ‘‘naive’’ best response to each








P for all i / 1. 4.6 . . . FF
This condition in turn implies that there exist « ) 0 and t* ) 0 such that
P, t, c P << ‘‘1’’ is strictly dominant for L in g if t - t* and P - «.4 . 7 .
Furthermore, by choosing « sufﬁciently small we can guarantee that for
all i / 1,
<< PP if P - «, then ui , f - u1, f for all f with f s b ; f s b . . . ii 11
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We will restrict ourselves to stochastic matrices P with
'<< < < P F t * r 2 I .4 . 9 .
Finally, with «* as in Lemma 1, we assume that
<< P - « *. 4.10 .
.  . P , t  P , tP , t . Let P be such that 4.7 ] 4.10 hold and denote by s s s , f an
P P. equilibrium on the distinguished curve in g c that connects the unique
P,0,cP P P. equilibrium of g with T c . We claim that
P, t << s - 1 r 2 I for all i / 1 and all t. 4.11 . i
Assume, to the contrary, that there exist some i / 1 and t such that
P, t << s G 1 r 2 Iand let t be the smallest t for which an equilibrium of this i
. type can be found. Then t G t* in view of 4.7 . Hence, at t s t, the total
P, t, c P << probability that F assigns to L playing i in g is at least t*r2 I ,s o
. P , t that 4.9 and Lemma 1 guarantee that f s b . At the same time we ii
have that
P, t P, t ' << << < < s s 1 y s ) 1 y I r 2 I s 1 r 2 G P  1 i
i / 1
P , t . . so that f s b by the same argument. But now 4.7 and 4.8 imply that 11
u
P , t , c P
i , f
P , t - u
P , t , c P
1, f
P,t ; . .
P , t . hence, s s 0. The contradiction shows that 4.11 holds. In particular, i
we have that s
P,1)1 r 2; hence f
P,1sb in view of Lemma 1. Applying 11 1
P ,1 ' . << Lemma 1 and 4.8 once more we see that, therefore, s F P for all i
i / 1; hence,
lim s
P,1s1. 1
<< P ª 0
This completes the proof. B
5. EVOLUTIONARY AND EDUCTIVE THEORIES
. In his unpublished dissertation Nash, 1950 , Nash already discussed two
interpretations of the equilibrium concept that he proposed. In the ﬁrst
‘‘mass-action’’ interpretation, one imagines that the game is played over
and over again with players constantly redrawn from large populations and
accumulating empirical information about the relative attractiveness ofIMPERFECTLY OBSERVABLE COMMITMENT 297
their various strategies. A stable rest-point of this dynamic process has to
be a Nash equilibrium. In the second ‘‘rationalistic’’ interpretation the
game is assumed to be played just once and the players are perfectly
rational so that they can ﬁgure out what each one will do. A rational
prediction about how the game will be played has to be a Nash equilibrium
since otherwise it is self-defeating. This second interpretation relies essen-
tially on the assumption that each game admits a unique rational solution.
. . The theories of Harsanyi and Selten 1988 and Harsanyi 1995 , as well as
the theory from Section 4.1, ﬁnd their origin in the fact that many games
admit multiple equilibria, hence, that Nash’s second justiﬁcation is incom-
plete. These theories attempt to obtain unique solutions by imposing
. stronger rationality requirements. In the terminology of Binmore 1987 ,
they are eductive theories, and not evolutionary theories.
. At the same time the theories of Harsanyi and Selten 1988 and of
.  . Harsanyi 1995 incorporate elements that are most or, perhaps, only
relevant in an evolutionary context. Speciﬁcally, these theories are strongly
. biased in favor of selecting pure strict equilibria and they start by
eliminating many mixed equilibria. The basic reason for this bias is that
 mixed equilibria typically have very poor stability properties cf. Harsanyi
. and Selten, 1988, p. 201; Harsanyi, 1995, footnote 12 . However, one may
very well wonder whether such a bias is justiﬁed; the stability property may
be relevant in an evolutionary context, but it is not clear that it has any
relevance in the case where the game is played only once and players rely
exclusively on deductive personal reﬂection in order to ﬁgure out what to
. play. For example, Kohlberg and Mertens’ 1986 concept of stable equilib-
rium attempts to capture strong rationality requirements and each com-
pletely mixed equilibrium is ‘‘strategically stable’’ as a singleton. Hence,
these theories may be criticized for the fact that they mix arguments that
are relevant in an evolutionary context with arguments that are relevant in
an eductive context.
Of course, not all games admit pure equilibria; hence, the theories of
Harsanyi and Selten and of Harsanyi do not always select strict equilibria.
To avoid the nonexistence problem, these theories rely on set-valued
solution concepts that can be viewed as generalizations of the concept of
. strict equilibrium. Harsanyi and Selten 1988 start by eliminating equilib-
. ria that do not belong to primitive formations and Harsanyi 1995 elimi-
. nates all equilibria that are not persistent Kalai and Samet, 1984 . A
primitive formation is a minimal set of strategy pairs that is closed with
respect to taking best responses
3 and it can be shown that, for generic
3 XX . X Formally, A9 s A = A is a formation of a game g if Bs ; A for all mixed 12 nm n
X  4 . strategies s of player m that assign positive probability only to Am , n g 1,2 . Minimal m m
formations are called primitive. They exist, are disjoint, and are ﬁnite in number.VAN DAMME AND HURKENS 298
two-person games, an equilibrium is persistent if and only if it belongs to a
primitive formation. In fact, a primitive formation is nothing else but a
. persistent retract in that case van Damme, 1995 . As one of us has shown
elsewhere, the stability property captured by persistency may indeed be
. relevant in an evolutionary context Hurkens, 1995 .
The game displayed in Fig. 3 may show that the restriction to persistent
equilibria may eliminate any noisy Stackelberg equilibrium. The game g
P
 has three equilibria: one corresponds to Proposition 1 with outcome
. .  B , E , another corresponds to Proposition 3 with outcome close to
. .  T , W , and there is a third mixed strategy equilibrium. Action B i.e., the
. dominant strategy of L in g is used with positive probability in all three
equilibria and the unique best response of player F against B in g
P is to
. 4 always respond with E. Consequently, B, EE is the unique primitive
P . formation in g , hence B, EE is the unique persistent equilibrium of this
game. Therefore, the theories of Harsanyi and Selten and Harsanyi select
the pure equilibrium of g as the solution of g
P. These theories conﬁrm
Bagwell’s claim that slight noise eliminates the commitment power.
The argument used in the above example can be generalized. If one
accepts persistency as a selection criterion, one is led to the conclusion
.  that in any game that is strictly dominance solvable i.e., the game can be
. reduced to a single strict equilibrium by repeated elimination of strictly
. dominated strategies slight noise eliminates the beneﬁts of the leader
being able to commit himself. Hence, the following proposition implies
that, for a certain class of games, Bagwell’s claim is justiﬁed in an
evolutionary setting of the game.
.  . P ROPOSITION 5. If g is strictly dominancesol¨able with outcome i*, j*,
 . 4 . then i*,j* i.e., L plays i* and F responds to each signal with j* is the
. P . unique primiti¨e formation resp. persistent retract of g ; hence, i*,j* is
the unique persistent equilibrium of g
P.
. . Proof. Since i*, j* is a strict equilibrium of g, i*,j* is a strict
P . 4 P equilibrium of g , hence i*,j* is a primitive formation of g . Let
P . R s R = R be a formation of g . We will show that i*,j* g R. LF
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Let i be an arbitrary pure strategy of L in R .I fi si * we are done, 1 L 1
so assume i / i*. The unique best response of F against i in g
P is b 1 1 i1




T be the sequence of games that results from g be repeated
elimination of all pure strategies that are strictly dominated. Hence,
1 T . t q 1 g s g , g only contains i*, j* and, for each player, g only contains
those pure strategies from g
t that are not strictly dominated in g
t. Since
i / i*, there exists t - T such that i is available in g
t but not in g
tq1. 11
Then b is available for F in g
t for t F t q 1. Let i be the unique best i 2 1
response of L in g against b . Then i is available in g
t for t F t q 1. i 2 1
Since i is the unique best response against b in g
P, we have i g R . 2 i 2 L 1
Furthermore, b is an available strategy for F in g
t for t F t q 1 and i2
b g R .I fi/ i *, we can repeat the above argument. In this way we iF2 2
generate a sequence i , i ,...,i of elements from R with i s i*. B 12 kL k
In the following sections we will again take a purely deductive perspec-
tive; hence, we will not a priori discriminate against equilibria in mixed
strategies. As a consequence, we will not restrict attention to persistent
equilibria and we will consider appropriate modiﬁcations of the theories of
Harsanyi and Harsanyi and Selten. We will see that these modiﬁcations
might, but need not, select a noisy Stackelberg equilibrium.
6. HARSANYI’S 1995 THEORY
. The basic assumption underlying Harsanyi’s 1995 theory is that the
probability that a player n will use one of his eligible strategies will be
proportional to the structural incentive to use this strategy. The structural
. incentive of a pure strategy is deﬁned as in 4.5 and the structural
incentive of a mixed strategy s of player n is given by n
c s s sac a.6 . 1 . . .  .  nn n n
a g A nn
 Note that for a mixed strategy it is not meaningful to deﬁne the structural
. . incentive as in 4.5 ; the number is generically zero. The prior probability
of a mixed strategy pair s is just the product of the individual probabilities,
c s s c s c s ,6 . 2 .  .  .  . 11 22
and, whenever there is one eligible equilibrium that has the highest
probability, Harsanyi selects this equilibrium as the solution. Formally,
 Harsanyi deﬁnes an equilibrium to be eligible if it is both proper Myerson,
. . 1978 and persistent Kalai and Samet, 1984 . Writing E for the set of
eligible equilibria, Harsanyi deﬁnes s* g E to be the solution of the game
.  . 4 if c s* ) c s for all s g E _ s*.VAN DAMME AND HURKENS 300
In the remainder of this section we show that, even in the case where
the Stackelberg equilibrium is a strict equilibrium of g
P and, hence,
satisﬁes Harsanyi’s eligibility criteria, Harsanyi’s theory need not select it.
Second, even the modiﬁed Harsanyi theory}that does not impose the
eligibility criterion}need not select the Stackelberg equilibrium. To
demonstrate these claims, consider the game from Fig. 4a, in which K is
some real positive number.
The game g from Fig. 4a is a unanimity game with Stackelberg outcome
.  . P T , W . Figure 4b displays a reduced form of the game g , where P
. involves uniform noise p s « if i / j . We have eliminated the strategy ij
P  EW for player F in g i.e., the strategy in which F responds to T by E
. and to B by W since this is a strictly dominated strategy. Harsanyi indeed
suggests eliminating such strategies before computing the players’ struc-
P .  . tural incentives. The game g has three equilibria T,WW , B, EE and a
.  . mixed equilibrium. In the latter, player L plays K«,1y« r K«q1y« ,
.  . while F plays 0,1,1 y « r 2 y « . The outcome of this mixed equilib-
. rium converges to the pure equilibrium B, E as « tends to zero. Only the
two pure equilibria satisfy Harsanyi’s eligibility criteria; hence, to compute
the Harsanyi solution of the game, we have to compare the prior probabili-
ties of these equilibria.
Note that the structural incentives for player L to use any of his pure
strategies are independent of K since they depend only on player L’s own
. payoff matrix. Furthermore, since in the limit as « tends to zero both
stability regions have a nonempty interior, the structural incentive of T as
FIGURE 4a
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well as of B remains bounded away from zero. The structural incentives of
player F are simple to calculate since, in the one-dimensional case, the
inversion mapping is measure preserving. Hence, the prior probability of a
strategy is just the Lebesgue measure of the stability set of that strategy.
Straightforward computations show that
c
« WW s «r K y K« q « 6.3 .  .  . F
and
c




« WW s K
2.6 . 5 .  .  . FF
« x 0
It follows that, if K is sufﬁciently large
lim c
« T,WW - lim c
« B, EE ,6 . 6 .  .  .
« x 0 « x 0
. so that Harsanyi’s theory selects the equilibrium B, EE in that case. For
large values of K, Harsanyi’s theory does not select the Stackelberg
equilibrium.
. . Note that the quantities in 6.3 and 6.4 converge to 0 as « tends to 0
since player F’s structural incentive for WE converges to 1: In the limit,
WE is weakly dominant. The structural incentive of F to use WE plays no
.  . role in the comparison between T,WW and B, EE since none of these
equilibria uses the strategy WE. However, this strategy is used with
positive probability in the unique mixed equilibrium of g
P. This mixed
equilibrium, hence, has a strictly positive structural incentive and Harsanyi’s
theory would have selected it had it not been eliminated by the persistency
requirement. As argued above, the persistency requirement might be out
of place in a deductive theory. However, the modiﬁed theory that drops
this requirement also does not select the Stackelberg equilibrium; the
. mixed equilibrium outcome converges to B, E as the noise vanishes.
7. THE HARSANYI AND SELTEN 1988 THEORY
. Harsanyi and Selten 1988 determine the solution of a game g by
. applying a recursive procedure see the ﬂowchart on p. 222 of their book .
Starting from a set of initial candidates, they successively eliminate candi-
dates that are either payoff-dominated or risk-dominated until, eventually,
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equilibrium from each primitive formation. Speciﬁcally, for a primitive
. formation A9, deﬁne pA 9 , the centroid of A9, as that mixed strategy pair
in which each player i chooses each element from A
X with equal probabil- i
ity. The ﬁrst candidate set is the set of outcomes that the tracing proce-
dure yields when applied to these centroids; hence, it is the ﬁnite set
  .. 4 TA 9: A 9 is a primitive formation .
The ﬁrst candidate set is reﬁned by using dominance criteria. The theory
incorporates both payoff dominance and risk dominance and the former is
considered to be more important. Formally, equilibrium s is said to
 . . dominate equilibrium s9 if either s payoff dominates s9 us ) us 9 for nn
. n s 1,2 , or s9 does not payoff dominate s and s risk dominates s9. Risk
dominance is deﬁned by means of the tracing procedure. An equilibrium s
is said to risk dominate an equilibrium s9 if the tracing procedure, when
.  . started at a certain bicentric prior ps ,s 9 ends up at the equilibrium s.
Harsanyi and Selten construct the bicentric prior in the following way.
Each player n will initially assume that his opponent m already knows
which of the two, s or s9, is the solution. Player n will assign a subjective
. probability z to the solution being s and, hence, to m playing s and he n m
will assign the complementary probability z
X s 1 y z to m playing s
X . nn m
After having constructed these beliefs, n will play a best response against
XX 
XX . zs q zs; in particular, n will play the centroid of Bz sq zs ; nm nm n nm nm
i.e., n chooses all best responses with equal probability. Denote this
. centroid by bz. Player m does not know n’s beliefs z and, according nn n
to the principle of insufﬁcient reason, m will assume that z is uniformly n
wx distributed on the interval 0, 1 . Hence, a priori m will expect n to play
the strategy
1
ps , s 9 s bzd z ,7 . 1 .  .  . H nn n n
0
and this prior is used as the starting point of the tracing procedure to
determine the risk dominance relation between s and s9. Formally, s risk
 . . dominates s9 if Tp s , s 9s s . This risk dominance relation is reﬂexive
and asymmetric. It need not be complete, nor transitive.
Write V
0 for the initial candidate set and deﬁne V
tq1 as the set of all
equilibria of V
t that are undominated within V




T contains one element then that equilibrium is the
solution of the game. Otherwise, there is a deadlock, which is resolved by a
substitution step. Speciﬁcally, the equilibria in V
T are replaced by the
trace of the centroid of V
T and the reduction process is continued with
Ty1 T  T ..4 the new candidate set V _ V j Tp V . In this way a decreasing
sequence of candidates sets is obtained; hence, the process terminates with
a unique equilibrium: the Harsanyi]Selten solution of the game.IMPERFECTLY OBSERVABLE COMMITMENT 303
7.1. Application to the Noisy Commitment Game
We have already seen in Section 5 that the Harsanyi]Selten theory need
not select a noisy Stackelberg equilibrium since such an equilibrium need
not belong to the initial candidate set. However, we also argued that this
elimination step is not entirely convincing. Hence, the question remains
whether the Stackelberg equilibrium can be eliminated by considerations
of payoff dominance or risk dominance.
Proposition 2 implies that a noisy Stackelberg equilibrium, when unique,
4
cannot be payoff dominated when the noise is small. Any Nash equilibrium
outcome of the noisy game converges to a Nash outcome of the game in
which the commitment is observed perfectly and among the latter the
Stackelberg equilibrium is most preferred by player L. Consequently, it
remains to address the question of whether the noisy Stackelberg equilib-
rium can be risk dominated. We have not been able to resolve the issue in
its complete generality, however, for two important subclasses of
. games}2 = 2 games and unanimity games}we can show that the noisy
Stackelberg equilibrium risk dominates any other equilibrium of g
P when
<< the noise P is small. Hence, in these two classes of games, the modiﬁed
 Harsanyi]Selten theory that does not restrict initial candidates to be
. primitive equilibria selects the noisy Stackelberg equilibrium.
:  .  . We say that g s I, J, u,¨ is a unanimity game if a I s J,b
. u s ¨ s 0 for all i / j, and c u ) 0 and ¨ ) 0 for all i. We simplify ij ij ii ii
. notation by writing u s u and ¨ s¨ and recall from 2.3 that u ) u ii i ii i 1i
for i / 1. We also write ‘‘i’’ for the strategy of player F in g
P that
prescribes to respond to any signal k g I by playing i g I.
PROPOSITION 6. Let g be a unanimity game. Then the Stackelberg equilib-
. P rium 1, 1 risk dominates any other equilibrium of g when the noise P is
small.
. Proof. We ﬁrst show that 1, 1 risk dominates any other pure Nash
P << . equilibrium of g when P is small. It sufﬁces to show that 1, 1 risk
. dominates 2, 2 . We ﬁrst compute the bicentric prior that is used in the
risk dominance comparison of these two equilibria. Let us ﬁrst compute
4 In general a game may have more than one noisy Stackelberg equilibrium; i.e., the game
g P may have multiple mixed equilibria that all converge to the Stackelberg equilibrium when
. the noise vanishes. An example is available from the authors upon request. The games that
we consider in this section do, however, have a unique noisy Stackelberg equilibrium.VAN DAMME AND HURKENS 304
. the prior p of player F.I fFplays z.1 q 1 y z .2 then the best response L
of L is
1i f z ) u r u q u . 21 2 P bz s 7.2 .  . L  2i f z - u r u q u ; . 21 2
hence, the prior of F is given by
u r u q u if i s 1 . 11 2 P pi s 7.3 .  . L  uruq u if i s 2. . 21 2
. Next we compute the prior of player L.I fLplays z.1 q 1 y z .2, then
the best response of F depends on the message that F receives and on the
size of the noise. However, since the posterior of F puts positive weight
only on the actions 1 and 2 of player L, F will respond with either 1 or 2 at
each possible message. Furthermore, if the noise is small, then F will
.  . respond to the message i s 1 resp. i s 2 with the action 1 resp. 2 for
most values of z. Hence, without doing any computations, we may state
that player L’s prior p
P corresponds to a behavioral strategy f
0 of player F
F that is of the form
f 1i f i s 1; ks1 ¡
0 ~f1i f i s 2; ks2 f s 7.4 . ik ¢ 4 0i f k f 1,2 .
 0 . f is the probability that F responds to signal i with action k. Now, let ik
P  P 0. .  . P , t , p P
the prior p s p , f be as in 7.3 , 7.4 and let the game g be as L
.  P , tP , t . in 4.1 . If t is sufﬁciently small, then the unique equilibrium s , f of
this game is the best reply against the prior; hence
1i f i s 1; ks1 ¡
P, t ~1i f i s 2; ks2 f s 7.5 . ik ¢ 4 0i f k f 1,2
<< and, provided that P is sufﬁciently small,
s
P, t s 1. 7.6 . 1
P  P . We claim that, if we move along the distinguished curve in G p by
increasing t, then player F has to switch his strategy before player L does.
The argument is simply that, if F does not switch from a strategy as in
. . 7.5 , then L is facing a convex combination of strategies of type 7.4 and
. . 7.5 ; hence, this is just a strategy of type 7.4 , against which the strategyIMPERFECTLY OBSERVABLE COMMITMENT 305
. from 7.6 is the unique best response. Hence, as t increases, player F’s
posterior beliefs put more and more weight on L playing ‘‘1’’ and gradu-
ally F switches to respond with ‘‘1’’ at more and more messages. Such
changes in behavior of F, however, do not necessitate a change in
. behavior of L; the strategy from 7.6 remains a best response. Conse-
quently, if no equilibrium is reached yet, F will have to change again.
. Eventually when t gets close to 1 , F’s posterior after the message ‘‘2’’
will put so much weight on L playing ‘‘1’’ that F will respond to that
message by playing ‘‘1’’ as well. At that point in time we have obtained the
. P equilibrium 1, 1 from g and no further adjustments are necessary.
. . Hence, starting at the prior 7.3 ] 7.4 , the tracing procedure converges to
. . . 1, 1 , so that 1, 1 risk dominates 2, 2 . Consequently, the Stackelberg
equilibrium risk dominates any pure equilibrium of g
P.
Next, let s9 be a mixed strategy equilibrium of g
P. Proposition 2 implies
that, if the noise is small, there exists an action i g I such that player L
. plays i with a probability very close to one. If i s 1, then 1, 1 is an
P, t, p P . equilibrium of g for all t. Hence, 1, 1 is the outcome of the tracing
procedure. If i / 1, then the proof follows exactly the same line as above:
Player L plays ‘‘1’’ for each value of t and player F switches several times
until he ﬁnally responds to all messages by playing ‘‘1.’’ B
Our ﬁnal result is
<< P ROPOSITION 7. If g is 2 = 2 game and P is small, then the noisy
Stackelberg equilibrium of g
P risk dominates all other equilibria of this game.
Proof. The result follows from Proposition 3 in case player F has a
 P . dominant strategy in gghas only one equilibrium in this case . Hence,
assume that F does not have a dominant strategy. Without loss of
generality assume b s 1 and b s 2. In case g does not have any pure 12
equilibria, the result again follows from Proposition 3 since g
P has a
unique equilibrium in this case. There are three cases left to consider:
.  . i 1, 1 is the unique pure equilibrium of g.
. . ii 2, 2 is the unique pure equilibrium of g.
.  .  . iii both 1, 1 and 2, 2 are pure equilibria in g.
The ﬁrst case is easy. It can be resolved by iterative elimination of
 strictly dominated strategies. It should be obvious from the description of
risk dominance that strategies that are iteratively strictly dominated can-
. not inﬂuence the risk dominance relationship. The strategy ‘‘21’’ of player
. F play k / i in response to i for i s 1,2 is strictly dominated and once
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 . . for player L. Note that action 1 is dominant for L in g in case i . The
third case is very much like the case considered in Proposition 6 and the
proof proceeds along the same lines. We leave the details to the reader. In
. P case ii , g has three equilibria, viz. a mixed equilibrium with outcome
. . close to 1,1 , a mixed equilibrium with outcome close to 2,2 , and the
. pure equilibrium 2,2 . We have to show that the ﬁrst equilibrium risk
dominates the latter two. The proof follows from an argument as in
Proposition 4. Namely, consider the bicentric prior p
P of player L in game F
g
P relevant for the comparison between the noisy Stackelberg equilibrium
. P . and the pure equilibrium 2,2 . With p deﬁned as in 7.1 , we have that F
lim p
P b s 1, 7.7 .  . F
<< P ª 0
since the strategy b of player F is a best response to the noisy Stackelberg
equilibrium and is ‘‘almost’’ a best response to the pure equilibrium.
Second, the bicentric prior of L relevant for the comparison between the
noisy Stackelberg equilibrium and the mixed equilibrium is given by
P. pb s 1, since the strategy b of player F is the unique best response F
against a strict convex combination of the two mixed equilibrium strategies
of player L in g
P. In both cases, the remainder of the proof proceeds
along similar lines as the proof of Proposition 4. B
Although we conjecture that the result from the Propositions 6 and 7
can be generalized to other classes of games, we have to admit that we
 have not been able to ﬁnd a general proof. We do not have a counterex-
. ample either. However, we note that applying the tracing procedure can
be rather complex, so that a multilateral procedure as that in Section
4}in which the tracing procedure is applied only once}might be prefer-
able to a theory in which one is forced to make a rather large number of
bilateral comparisons. Furthermore, in order to apply the Harsanyi]Selten
. theory one has to ﬁrst compute all primitive equilibria of the game. We
were able to prove Proposition 4 without knowing this set of all equilibria.
8. CONCLUSION
Can we now conclude that many predictions derived from models with
. commitment may require reconsideration? As Bagwell 1995 showed, with
regard to pure strategy equilibria, ﬁrst-mover advantages do not survive
imperfect observability, even when the imperfection is slight. With regard
to mixed strategy equilibria, a carefully balanced appraisal is called for.
The noisy game analyzed by Bagwell may have multiple mixed strategyIMPERFECTLY OBSERVABLE COMMITMENT 307
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equilibria and at least one of these induces an outcome that is close to the
Stackelberg outcome of the game in which the commitment can be
. observed perfectly Proposition 3 . This paper has presented several argu-
ments for why exactly this outcome is the unique focal one, so that one
 would expect perfectly rational players to coordinate on it Propositions 4,
. 6, and 7 . Given these results, the present authors do not see any need to
reconsider the fundamental game theoretic insight that the power to
commit oneself may be beneﬁcial.
APPENDIX
The game from Fig. A1. may show that Proposition 1 is not correct for
. games that do not satisfy the regularity condition 2.1 . The unique pure
.  . equilibrium of the game g of Fig. 5 is B, E . However, T,WE is also a
pure Nash equilibrium of the noisy commitment game and this equilibrium
. results in the outcome T,W . The reader might object that the latter
 equilibrium is not credible since it is not perfect although it certainly is
. sequential . This deﬁciency is easily eliminated by adding a third
. dominated strategy of player L to the game against which W is the
unique best response of player F.
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